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Abstract—The paper deals with the political economy 
determinants of EU agri-environmental measures 
(AEMs) applied by 59 regional/country units, during the 
2001-2004 period. Five different groups of determinants, 
spanning from positive and negative externalities to 
political institutions, are highlighted and tested using an 
econometric model. The main results suggest that AEMs 
implementation is mostly affected by the strength of 
farm lobbies, political institutions and the demand for 
positive externalities. On the contrary, AEMs do not 
seem implemented by the willingness to address negative 
externalities. 
Keywords—Agri-environmental Measures, Political 
Economy, EU Regions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Agri-environmental measures (AEMs) are the most 
important rural development instrument in terms of both 
financial expenditure - about 44% of the Pillar II CAP 
money - and land coverage area - 25% of EU utilized 
agricultural area. As an effect of this prominent role and 
because of their particular nature, AEMs represent one of 
the most debated instruments of the new CAP. For example, 
the European Commission underlines the positive effects of 
AEMs, claiming future expansion. By contrast, sceptics 
express doubts regarding their genuineness, accusing them 
of disguising agriculture protection (Anderson, 2000; 
Swinbank, 2001). 
Two broad objectives are formally assigned to AEMs by 
the ruler: i) reducing environmental risks and ii) preserving 
nature and cultivated landscapes (EU Commission, 2005). 
Thus, the question arises of whether AEMs real driving 
forces correspond to those declared by EU legislators or, 
whether, differently, other ‘hidden’ determinants affect their 
implementation. 
Making an attempt to better understand the real 
motivation behind agri-environmental schemes, this paper 
proposes a political economy analysis of the AEMs 
implementation determinants, focusing particularly on their 
political bargaining process. From this perspective, few 
papers have systematically investigated the issue (see Baylis 
et al., 2005, 2006; Salhofer and Glebe, 2004) and, more 
importantly, they have treated the problem only at a national 
level. However, it is important to note that EU legislation 
allows MS to design schemes at the national or regional 
level in order to adapt schemes to the different farming 
systems and environmental conditions. Thus, since AEMs 
are established at the regional level Regions, not Member 
States, are the relevant decision-making units of the 
analysis. 
Our paper covers the implementation of all 59 agri-
environmental programs of the EU-15 members from 2001 
to 2004. Apart from focusing on the effective units of 
analysis, we also try to better characterize some important 
dimensions of the AEMs political bargaining process, by 
highlighting the important role played by political 
institutions. Specifically, the analysis tests five main 
hypotheses about the driving forces leading AEMs 
diffusion:  i) agricultural political weight, ii) negative 
externalities limitation, iii) positive externalities social 
demand,  iv) public budget constraints, and finally v) 
political institutions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized so that the next 
Section reviews the evidence from previous literature, while 
Section 3 puts forward our key testable hypotheses and the 
model specification. Section 4 presents the results. 
II. PREVIOUS EVIDENCE 
Only a few papers have investigated the determinants of 
AEMs from a political economy perspective. Indeed, to 
date, this approach has been adopted by Baylis et al. (2005, 
2006) and Sahlofer and Glebe (2004, 2007). However, 
although related to local compensation payment for 
providing landscape amenities, Hackl et al. (2007) offer a 
convincing interpretation of the political bargaining process 
of agri-environmental policies. 
Starting with the US and EU diverging attitudes towards 
agri-environmental policies, Baylis et al. (2005, 2006) 
analyze the economic and political determinants of AEM 
expenditure of EU countries, from 1993 to 2003. The 
authors investigate the extent to which AEMs are driven by 
genuine objectives to reduce negative externalities and by   2 
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satisfying public demand for landscape amenities or, 
differently, how they are a disguised attempt to support 
farmers’ income. The paper proposes four plausible policy 
scenarios (or ‘lenses’) for which AEMs could be 
encouraged. In the pollution lens AEMs aim at reducing 
agriculture environmental impact, while in the green 
demand lens they correspond to social request for positive 
externalities. Other scenarios are represented by the 
budgetary lens in which is hypothesized a partial 
substitution of traditional farm income support with ‘green’ 
labeled instruments, and by the cynical lens in which the 
only purpose is to merely maintain traditional farming 
subsidies. 
Analogies with the above mentioned approach can be 
found in Glebe and Sahlofer (2007), who aim to understand 
the heterogeneity in the uptake of AEMs across EU 
countries. They empirically test a political preference 
function model on AEMs implementation between 1998 
and 2002, focusing on factors like environmental benefits, 
agricultural lobby influence, private costs of adhesion, and 
both national and EU budget pressure. The latter 
determinant is strictly related to the so-called ‘restaurant 
table effect’, for whom non-cooperatively acting countries 
split co-financed policy costs among other contributors, thus 
determining total public-resource overspending (see 
Pokrivcak and Swinnen, 2004). 
Hackl et al. (2007) modeled the political bargaining 
process related to Austrian local agri-environmental 
programs. Considering factors affecting this process, they 
stress the role of transaction costs existing within and 
among categories of involved stakeholders (farmers, 
beneficiaries and politicians). Environmental benefits, 
opportunity costs, structural differences and budget 
constraints have also been taken into account. A key 
advantage of the Hackl et al. study, over the previously 
mentioned papers, is its focus on the local  actors 
responsible for the decision and implementation of the agri-
environmental policies. Indeed, a national focus may mask 
several key details that could be very important in the 
analysis of AEMs, given their particular nature of site-
specific policies. 
III. HYPOTHESES, DATA AND SPECIFICATION 
Starting from the previous evidence, we advance, in what 
follows, some hypotheses on the most influential factors 
potentially affecting AEMs intensity across EU regions. To 
organize the discussion we focus on five broad 
determinants: i) agricultural political weight, ii) negative 
externalities limitation, iii) positive externalities demand, 
iv) budget constraints and, last but not least, v) political 
institutions. It is important to observe that these hypotheses 
are not mutually excludable. 
A.  Hypotheses and explanatory variables 
Hypothesis 1: AEMs implementation should be positively 
affected by agricultural political weight. 
Generally speaking, the agricultural lobby strength is 
characterized by its ability to seek public transfers. Thus, 
we expect a positive relationship between Pillar I and 
AEMs expenditure. To construct our key proxy to capture 
the farmers’ political weight we use the total regional 
transfer to the agricultural sector (price support plus direct 
and other payments) as a share of the regional agricultural 
gross value added at basic prices (EU Commission, 2001). 
Moreover, to better capture the strength of the farm lobby 
we also include the agricultural labor share, land 
inequality
1, the female and young farmers share. The first 
two variables make it possible to control for traditional 
factors like relative group size and sector heterogeneity, 
both elements that affect the transaction costs of the 
political bargaining process. Differently, the female and 
young farmers share are indicators of higher environmental 
sensitivity and a better education level (Hackl et al., 2007). 
 
Hypothesis 2: AEMs implementation should be positively 
affected by the level of agriculture negative externalities. 
Agri-environmental schemes provide economic 
compensation for those farmers who choose to adopt more 
extensive agricultural methods, in order to reduce negative 
externalities. In such a scenario, intensive farming areas 
represent the most suitable target for measures (European 
Commission, 2005). Hence, to confirm the assumption that 
reducing agricultural pollution is an AEMs key objective, 
we expect a positive correlation with agricultural 
productivity linked variables. On the other hand, intensive 
farming incurs higher opportunity costs in complying with 
program commitments, thus discouraging adhesion. In line 
with previous literature, the intensity of agricultural 
production is measured by three proxies: regional average 
yield of wheat, regional nitrogen surplus, and the share of 
pasture and permanent grassland over the whole agricultural 
area. AEMs payments are calculated on the basis of the 
additional costs and the loss of income involved in 
complying with environmental standards beyond a reference 
baseline. These baseline requirements, called Good Farming 
Practice (GFP), represent the minimal environmental 
quality standard from which a farmer’s efforts are 
compensated. As GFPs are not univocal, but are defined 
                                                           
1. Land inequality is measured by the Gini index of operational 
agricultural land holdings, based on Eurostat data.   3 
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locally, it is conceivable that a high degree of environmental 
compliance might act as a deterrent to the farmer’s 
involvement in AEMs. To quantify the GFPs level we use 
the European Environment Agency (EEA) IRENA project 
indicators and, particularly, IRENA 02 indicator ‘Regional 
levels of good farming practices’. 
 
Hypothesis 3: AEMs implementation should be positively 
affected by agricultural positive externalities social demand 
Social demand for agricultural positive externalities and, 
more generally, for environmental amenities is linked to 
individual economic welfare. Thus, our primary proxy for 
the demand of positive externality is the regional GDP per-
capita in real terms. 
However, because this variable only imperfectly captures 
the social demand for environmental goods, other proxies 
have been included in the analysis. Tourism intensity, which 
is captured by the rate of tourism arrivals per 1,000 
inhabitants, should approximate the direct landscape 
fruition. Moreover, access to an information network, 
measured as internet users per 1,000 inhabitants, might 
indirectly approach similar concerns. Other relevant proxies 
used to disentangle the demand for positive externalities are 
the severity of environmental legislation and the green 
voters share. Moreover, the last variable also proxies for 
political pressure from environmentalist lobbies. Following 
Baylis et al. (2006) environmental legislation is measured 
by the EEA (2005b) ranking, that classifies countries with a 
score from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). The Regional green voters 
share was built starting from the 1999 European Parliament 
Elections. 
 
Hypothesis 4: AEMs implementation should be affected 
by public budget constraints 
Following the Glebe and Sahlofer (2007) paper about the 
AEMs co-financing system, we tested the ‘restaurant table 
effect’ by taking into account the ‘regional contribution’ to 
the whole EU budget, proxied by the share of regional GDP 
on EU-15 GDP. In order to smooth the strong 
regional/national size differences we express such variable 
in a logarithmic form. 
The regional/national budgetary pressure linked to the 
adhesion to agri-environmental measure is closely related to 
the public budget deficit, configuring itself like a public 
administration opportunity cost (Glebe and Sahlofer, 2007). 
Due to the lack of data on regional deficits, the budgetary 
pressure variable is indirectly based on the previous five 
years average regional growth rate. An analogous meaning 
is attributable to the variable indicating the share of farms 
located in less favoured areas (LFA). 
 
Hypothesis 5: AEMs implementation should be affected 
by political institutions. 
AEMs regional implementation has many points in 
common with EU Structural (or Regional) policies. One of 
these is represented by the chance to define the policy 
intervention at the regional level, thus involving local 
political bargaining, in addition to national and 
communitarian bargaining. From this perspective we follow 
Kemmerling and Bodenstein (2006) in indicating the strong 
influence of political partisanship in regional funding 
allocations. These authors refer to a positive effect of left 
and euro-sceptic partisan ideology in the regional 
redistribution of EU Structural Funds. These effects are 
respectively motivated by left-wing parties’ traditional 
preference for redistributive public expenditure and by the 
attempt to compensate EU integration process losers or, in 
other words, voters who gain little benefit from the 
Common Market or Monetary Union. Moreover Hackl et al. 
(2007) find a positive relationship between AEMs intensity 
and left parties’ share. In their opinion, such results could 
reveal discontinuity in innovative agri-environmental 
contracts from long-established income support instruments, 
put forward by political groups to whom farmers 
traditionally refer, like conservatives. These predictions are 
tested by using the 1999 European Parliament Election 
results referred to each of the AEMs territorial units. 
Following Kemmerling and Bodenstein (2006), if we point 
our attention to left ideology or euro-sceptics, we can 
include in these categories those parties enrolled in specific 
European Political Groups. 
Strictly related to party competition is the mean electoral 
district magnitude, i.e. the average number of Members of 
the Lower House elected in each constituency. On the one 
hand, the larger the district magnitude, the greater the 
probability for minority parties without territorial 
concentration, like environmentalists, to obtain political 
representation. On the other hand, the literature on 
comparative politics (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000) 
suggests that majoritarian elections, characterized by small 
district magnitude, tend to be associated with political 
incentives directed towards local public goods. This 
variable, collected at the national level, comes from the 
World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 
2001). 
B. The dependent variable 
The basic data to measure AEMs intensity are extracted 
from the Common Monitoring Indicators collected by the 
UE Commission for the programmes’ evaluation process. 
For each European country, AEMs have been drawn up at 
the geographical level, deemed as the most appropriate.   4 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
Following this prescription some States have implemented 
schemes at the national level, while others realized regional 
programs. At the former level we find France, Ireland, 
Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Greece, Denmark and 
Luxembourg. Instead Germany, Italy, Belgium and the 
United Kingdom, in relation to their institutional 
differences, chose to apply AEMs regionally. Overall, to 
explain the main economic and political constraints on the 
implementation of agri-environmental measures, we use 
data from 59 EU territorial units observed for the years from 
2001 to 2004. Thus, our panel has a total number of 236 
observations. 
The AEMs implementation intensity is expressed as the 
ratio between agri-environmental payments and agricultural 
gross value added . This choice is motivated by two main 
considerations. First, the heterogeneous nature of agri-
environmental measures, where, for example, several 
schemes could cover the same surface, have generated 
problems of double counting in quantifying the physical 
share of the total utilized agricultural area under agri-
environmental commitments (see EEA 2005a). Thus, a 
measure based on the effective expenditure overcomes such 
problems. Moreover, by measuring AEMs intensity in terms 
of expenditure on agriculture value added, we stay close to 
the literature that has investigated the determinants of 
agricultural support using endogenous variables, like 
producer subsidy equivalent. 
Table 1 shows a statistics summary of the explanatory 
variables described above. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std.  Dev.
Dependent variable
AEMs Intensity 3.12 20.14 0.16 3.34
Agricultural political weight
Pillar I expenditure  36.46 88.94 2.80 17.61
Agricultural labor share 4.61 14.95 0.36 3.41
Agricultural labor share squared 21.28 223.59 0.13 11.60
Land inequality 58.69 82.03 2.72 12.59
Female 20.46 41.88 7.65 9.95
Young 10.77 18.63 3.89 4.06
Negative externalities limitation
Nitrogen surplus 56.36 202.00 9.00 44.92
Yield 5.14 9.81 0.84 2.45
Pasture 37.91 99.13 0.92 24.73
Level of good farming practices 59.12 82.00 33.00 9.50
Positive externalities demand
GDP per capita 24,385.00 59,778.79 10,5636.31 7,873.91
Tourism intensity 1,895.72 10,000.40 504.00 1,745.01
Green voters share 4.71 22.61 0.00 4.60
Environmental legislation 2.85 5.00 1.00 1.46
Internet 25.86 45.60 9.20 7.02
Budget constraints
Region GDP/EU GDP 1.69 16.85 0.01 3.01
Region 5 year avg GDP growth  4.24 14.96 -0.51 2.39
Less favoured area 55.79 100.00 0.00 26.79
Political institutions
Left 38.83 64.03 11.64 13.42
Left * land inequality 2,276.34 4,938.82 91.57 948.08
District magnitude 9.17 150.00 1.00 19.14
Eurosceptics 20.45 46.55 0.00 13.31 
IV. REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 2 displays the regression results of the model 
specification described in the previous section. In particular, 
we report the results of two specifications. Model I is a 
pooled regression where we do not control for country fixed 
effects, whereas in Model II we control for unobserved 
country heterogeneities by including a set of country fixed 
effects. The key differences between the two models, other 
than fixed effects, come from some variables that lack a 
regional variation. Indeed, we are forced to omit them from 
Model II due to their perfect collinearity with the country 
fixed effects. 
Following the previous discussion, we organized the 
results presentation by grouping the set of explanatory 
variables into five categories, that should represent the main 
driving forces affecting the level of AEMs implementation. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the borders 
across these groups are not always so sharp. 
At the general level, the explanatory power of the 
models, measured by the adjusted R
2, appears quite high, 
also taking into account the cross-sectional nature of the 
data set. Model I accounts for about 72% of the variation in 
AEMs expenditure, while in Model II the overall 
explanatory power reaches 89%. The proxies related to 
farmer political weight are all significant at the 5 or 10 
percent level, with the exclusion of the agricultural 
employment share squared that, in Model I, is insignificant, 
and land inequality that, in Model II, is insignificant. The 
signs of the estimated coefficients are, generally speaking, 
in line with a priori expectations, suggesting that the 
relationship between the power of the farm lobby and the 
agro-environmental measures are not so different from the 
vast literature on agricultural support determinants (see de 
Gorter and Swinnen 2002 for a review). AEMs expenditure 
is strongly, and positively, related to the level of Pillar I 
expenditure, suggesting that the two policies tend to be 
complementary. In model II the agricultural labor share 
displays a U-shaped relationship with agro-environmental 
expenditure. This means that the relationship is negative for 
a low level of agricultural labour share but, beyond the 
threshold of about 8%, any further increase in the size of the 
farm group tends to increase AEMs expenditure. The proxy 
finalized to capture heterogeneity in the farm group, namely 
land distribution inequality, affects the level of AEMs 
expenditure negatively, a result in line with recent literature 
on inequality and collective action problems (see Bardhan et 
al. 2001; Olper 2007).  
Finally, an increase in the share of females and young 
farmers affects AEMs implementation positively, although 
the latter variable is only significant in Model I.   5 
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AEMs expenditure is not particularly affected by the 
level of existing negative externalities, namely regions 
where agriculture is more intensive, causing environmental 
damage, have not a high level of agro-environmental 
expenditure. Furthermore AEMs expenditure is lower in 
regions where the nitrogen surplus is higher. Thus, from this 
perspective, even at the regional level we find confirmation 
of the evidence of Baylis et al. (2006), who show how 
countries systematically having the largest production of 
negative externalities are investing the least amount of 
money in AEMs measures. 
Table 2. Determinants of agri-environmental expenditure 
Coefficient P-value B coeff. Coefficient P-value B coeff.
Agricultural political weight
Pillar I expenditure  0.045 0.000 0.239 0.069 0.000 0.362
Agricultural labor share 0.574 0.006 0.585 -0.368 0.011 -0.376
Agricultural labor share squared -0.007 0.532 -0.106 0.024 0.007 0.346
Land inequality -0.073 0.088 -0.274 -0.031 0.376 -0.118
Female 0.177 0.000 0.528 0.099 0.000 0.294
Young 0.144 0.020 0.175 -0.046 0.379 -0.056
Negative externalities limitation
Nitrogen surplus -0.015 0.000 -0.202 -0.009 0.043 -0.127
Yield 0.025 0.843 0.018 -0.081 0.480 -0.059
Pasture 0.001 0.909 0.006 -0.013 0.095 -0.094
Level of good farming practices 0.009 0.685 0.024
Positive externalities demand
GDP per capita 0.0002 0.000 0.523 0.0001 0.000 0.304
Tourism intensity 0.0005 0.000 0.255 0.0003 0.000 0.153
Green voters share 0.068 0.060 0.094 -0,130 0.002 -0.179
Environmental legislation 0.922 0.000 0.404
Internet 0.292 0.000 0.614
Budget constraints
Log (Region GDP/EU GDP) -0.227 0.117 -0.099 -0.504 0.000 -0.220
Region 5 year avg GDP growth  0.586 0.000 0.418 -0.050 0.572 -0.036
Less favoured areas  -0.022 0.028 -0.178 -0.012 0.058 -0.098
Political institutions
Left -0.184 0.004 -0.741 -0.184 0.000 -0.738
Left * land inequality 0.004 0.000 1,078 0.003 0.000 0.825
District magnitude -0.036 0.000 -0.205
Eurosceptics -0.009 0.493 -0.035 -0.048 0.003 -0.190
Year fixed effects
Country fixed effects












Notes: OLS regressions robust to etheroschedasticity. β 
coefficients are calculated by dividing the standardized estimated 
coefficients by the standard deviation of the dependent variables 
 
In contrast, AEMs expenditure is strongly positive when 
related to positive externalities demand. More specifically, 
the level of GDP per capita, tourism intensity, the strength 
of environmental legislation, the diffusion of internet and, 
finally, the share of regional votes going to Green parties, 
all exert a significant positive effect on AEMs intensity. 
However, the strength of Green parties is not robust to 
specification changes, as the inclusion of country fixed 
effects induces a change in the sign of the estimated 
coefficient, that now turns out to be significantly negative. 
Thus, while these results are broadly consistent with the 
previous evidence, it also appears that working at the 
regional level can lead to more complex relationships than 
previously suggested. 
The ‘regional contribution’ to the EU budget negatively 
affects the AEMs intensity. Thus, the result tends to give 
some support to the so-called ‘restaurant table effect’, 
namely the tendency of the CAP decision-making process to 
overprotect agriculture, a result in line with the Glebe and 
Salhofer (2007) evidence obtained at the national level. The 
positive coefficient of the real GDP growth of the previous 
five years (although becoming insignificantly negative in 
Model II) and the negative coefficient referred to LFA show 
the role of public opportunity costs in co-financing policies.  
The last group of considered variables are political 
institutions. Both partisan ideology and district magnitude 
negatively affect agri-environmental expenditure. 
Moreover, and this is quite interesting, the effect of left-
wing ideology orientation is conditional to the level of land 
inequality, namely an interaction effect between these 
variables has a significant positive effect on AEMs 
expenditure. The negative effect of the left-wing orientation 
on AEMs expenditure contrasts with the hypothesis and 
results obtained by Kemmerling and Bodestein (2006), who 
find a positive effect of left orientation on EU structural 
funds expenditure. However, this result is in line with the 
notion that farmers are traditionally represented by political 
conservatives (see Hackl et al. 2007; Olper 2007). 
Moreover, a possible interpretation of the interaction effect 
between left-wing orientation and land inequality is that in 
regions with a strong unequal land distribution, the resulting 
large fraction of small farmers tends to be affiliated with left 
oriented farm groups. Examples in this direction exist in 
some European countries, like France and Italy, where small 
farmers have their ad hoc organization related to left-wing 
parties. 
On the other hand, the negative relationship between 
district magnitude and AEMs expenditure appears in line 
with the prediction of the recent political economy model 
about the effect of electoral rules on policy outcomes (see 
Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Indeed, these models predict 
that majoritarian electoral rules (vis-à-vis proportional 
ones), characterized by small district magnitude, tend to 
benefit especially narrow, and not broad, interests, and the 
production of local public goods. 
Finally, columns 3 and 6 of the table display the β 
coefficients, with the purpose of addressing which variable 
or, better still, which group of determinants contributes the 
most to the regression. By taking into account the less than 
perfect categorization of our proxies in each category, what 
emerges from the analysis of the β coefficients is that the 
proxies related to farmer political weight, to political 
institutions and to positive externalities demand are the   6 
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most important explanatory variables affecting AEMs 
expenditure. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Agri-environmental measures represent the most 
innovative, and important, rural development policies of the 
new CAP. At the same time, AEMs are one of the most 
debated instruments. Indeed, the European Commission 
underlines AEMs positive effects, pushing for their future 
expansion; however, some scepticism still exists concerning 
their genuineness, accusing them of disguised agriculture 
protection. 
Thus, in order to better understand the real motivation 
behind agri-environmental schemes, this paper proposes a 
political economy analysis of their implementation 
determinants. 
To this end we exploit the rich information of 59 agri-
environmental programs implemented at both national and 
regional level, over the 2001-2004 period. We test five main 
hypotheses about  the driving forces leading to AEMs 
diffusion:  i) agricultural political weight, ii) negative 
externalities limitation, iii) positive externalities social 
demand,  iv) public budget constraints, and finally v) 
political institutions. 
The main results suggest that variable proxies related to 
farmer political weight, political institutions and the demand 
for positive externalities are the most important explanatory 
variables affecting AEMs expenditure. Also budget 
constraints seem to play a significant role. 
However, AEMs expenditure and diffusion do not appear 
particularly affected by the level of existing negative 
externalities, suggesting that regions where agriculture is 
more intensive, causing worse environmental damage, are 
only marginally affected by the potential environmental 
benefit due to the diffusion of agro-environmental 
measures. This is quite a notable finding, and subsequent 
policy implications become evident if we observe that 2/3 
of the AEMs public funds are devoted to minimizing 
negative externalities. 
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